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The Political Economy of Constitution 
 
Introduction 
The distinction between constitution (as the set of fundamental normative premises ensuring 
the cohesion of any given polity) and contract (as the set of formal deliberations agreed upon 
by the relevant stakeholders in that polity) is central to political economy. In fact, there is 
increasing recognition in economic analysis that institutional rules and constraints emerge and 
evolve on the basis of relations, dispositions and beliefs belonging to a µFRQVWLtutional sphere¶ 
of social connectivity that is primary to contracts and formal norms (Aoki 2001, 2010; North 
2005). The recent literature on decision-making in the social sphere addresses this point to 
some extent by calling attention to the role of pattern recognition and framing in a context-
specific and relational setting (Bacharach, 1986, 1997, 2006; Mehta, Starmer and Sugden, 
1994; Turner, 2001; Drolet and Suppes, 2008; Scazzieri, 2001, 2008; Porta and Scazzieri 
2003; Arena, 2003; Arena and Larrouy, 2016).1 However, the discussion of the principles 
governing the transference of social dispositions into formal and enforceable covenants 
largely takes place within the framework of rational choice and theories of contract (Gauthier, 
1986; Vallentyne, 1991; Gauthier and Sugden, 1993; Binmore, 1994, 1998; Skyrms, 2014). 
As a result, the way in which patterns of social connectivity lead to binding commitments 
with a specific content beyond formal rules and procedures remains largely unexplored. 
 This paper seeks to outline a political economy of constitution in which constitution is 
defined as a constellation of interests that is prior to formal arrangements and that determines 
the way in which formal rules and procedures operate within a specific setting. Our emphasis 
on substantive arrangements differs from the more formalist conception of institutions in the 
                                                        
1 The interdependence between framing and reciprocal social recognition has long being acknowledged in social 
theory, JRLQJ EDFN DW OHDVW WR $GDP 6PLWK¶V DQDO\VLV RI social mirroring in the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(Smith, 1976 [1759]). See also Scazzieri (2006), Amadae (2008). 
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FRQWUDFWXDOLVW WUDGLWLRQ ZKLFK LV JRYHUQHG E\ D µFRYHQDQW RI UHDVRQ¶ /HYL 2 By 
contrast, we emphasise the more substantive approach in the classic constitutionalist tradition, 
ZKLFK FDQ EH GHVFULEHG LQ WHUPV RI D µFRYHQDQW RI SUDFWLFH¶3 More specifically, our 
conception of constitution accentuates the relationships that underpin the ordering of 
functions and relative positions within a given society (Pabst and Scazzieri 2012). Here we 
also draw on the work of the legal scholar Costantino Mortati who distinguishes between 
FRQVWLWXWLRQµLQWKHIRUPDOVHQVH¶DQGconstitution µLQWKHPDWHULDOVHQVH¶0RUWDWL). In 
0RUWDWL¶VYLHZWKHµPDWHULDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶LVWKHUHODWLYHO\SHUVLVWHQWVWUXFWXUHRIGLVSRVLWLRQV
interests and beliefs that turns DQ\ JLYHQ µIRUPDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶ LQWR DQ HIIHFWLYH ERG\ RI
socially admissible practices.4 
 This approach has far-reaching implications for the relationship between economics 
and politics. In particular, we argue that the µFRQVWLWXWLRQDORXWORRN¶RISROLWLFDOHFRQRP\LVD
domain of feasible arrangements that is prior to either markets or states. This point of view 
entails the mutual embedding of the economic and political spheres. From this perspective, 
individual or collective interests are not seen in binary terms as necessarily compatible or 
rival but rather as rooted in a relational space that points beyond the dichotomy between 
consensus and conflict. 
 SecWLRQH[SORUHVWKHFRQFHSWXDOOLQNVEHWZHHQµSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\¶DQGµFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶
in terms of connectivity within and across multiple levels in society. Section 2 ties 
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 7KLVUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQKDVSRLQWVLQFRPPRQZLWKEXWLVDOVRVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURP-DPHV%XFKDQDQ¶V
approach to constitutions as normative frameworks to be assessed in terms of allocative efficiency (Buchanan 
1990). For we are especially interested in the way in which the economic constitution of any given society 
allows manifold individual and/or groups to coalesce around partially overlapping interests and thus to bring 
about patterns of social congruence. On the other hand, our conception shares some of the concerns raised by 
Douglass Cecil North and other scholars as to the historical conditions rendering certain rules and procedures 
effective in certain contexts and ineffective in others (North 1990, 2005; North and Weingast 1989; North, 
Wallis and Weingast 2010). 
3  On this constitutionalist tradition, see MacIlwain (1939, 1958), Pocock (1987), Matteucci (1993), Pabst (2014).  
4
 Mortati argues that any formal political settlement presupposes an ³original constitution´, that is, the existence 
of a unifying interest that is associated with a particular social group (or constellation of groups) and is the 
expression of  ³a particular form of [normative] order´ (Mortati, 1998, p. 53). The constitutional character of this 
normative order derives from its relative stability, even if ³oscillations in the relative weights of the interests 
underlying it´ cannot be excluded (Mortati, 1998, p. 53). However, these oscillations must be consistent with the 
existence of a ³relative fixed [central] point´ (Mortati, 1998, p. 53n). See also Alexander, 1998, for a different 
but complementary perspective on the conceptual foundations of constitutionalism. 
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connectivity to the configuration of individual and group interests and examines the 
corresponding conditions for constitutional congruence. Section 3 turns to the µconstitution of 
economic policy¶ and explores the implications of partially overlapping spheres of interest for 
feasible and effective decision-making in the economic-political domain. The final section 
provides some concluding reflections. 
 
:K\µSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\RIFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶" 
Political economy is typically concerned with the economic and political arrangements of a 
given society, whereas constitution commonly refers to juridical-legal norms, rules and 
regulations that govern the people within a given territory. In the contemporary literature, the 
relationship between the two is generally addressed by interpreting a constitutional settlement 
in terms of its allocative efficiency and by constructing a political-economic system in terms 
of the formal rules and procedures that make its working feasible. By contrast, this paper 
takes the view that both constitution and political economy belong to a more fundamental 
domain of social connectivity that pre-exist formal consent procedures, which underpins the 
interdependence and interactions between individuals and/or groups. 
 Our argument runs as follows. First, we distinguish political economy from both 
economics and politics. According to common conceptions, economics denotes primarily 
decision-making about the allocation of resources between individuals, whereas politics 
concerns collective decision-making about the distribution of resources between different 
groups in society. Both fields are seen as largely self-contained spaces governed by 
instrumental rationality LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI D µWKLFN GHVFULSWLRQ¶ *HHUW] 1975) of the social 
space.5 This approach denies political economy an autonomous space of inquiry and leads 
either to the absorption of politics into economics (e.g. North, Wallis and Weingast 2010) or 
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 We have in mind the distinction between economics and political economy after Marshall (1890) and also the 




to its opposite (e.g. Blyth 2013). On the contrary, we argue that the two spheres are 
independent of each other, even if they are mutually embedded by virtue of their joint 
inclusion within the same configuration of social interdependencies. Second, we argue that 
political economy is primarily a theory about the ordering of different functions and an 
arranging of different positions, which embed both the economic and the political sphere. 
Here we draw on the work of John Hicks who clearly distinguishes between economics as a 
theory of rational market behaviour, which he calls catallactics (following Richard Whately 
1831, Francis Edgeworth 1881 and Ludwig Mises 1949), and economics as a theory of the 
formation and distribution of the social product, for which he reserves the term plutology 
(Hicks 1982). In the words of Hicks, analysts in the latter tradition  ³ORRNHGDWWKHHFRQRPLF
V\VWHPSULPDULO\IURPWKHSURGXFWLRQDQJOH´ZKHUHDV³WKHFDWDOODFWLVWVORRNHGDWLWSULPDULO\
from the side of exchange´ +LFNV+LFNV¶emphasis on the µsocial product¶ as the 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFILHOGRIµSOXWRORJ\¶points to the complex structures of social interdependencies 
that characterise both the economy and the polity as well as their relationship. 
 Third, we presuppose a certain µconstitution of interests¶ ± a structured space that is 
prior to decisions concerning the allocation and/or distribution of resources between different 
social groups.  
 Our conception of political economy is different from influential accounts in both 
economics and politics that seek to re-embed social relationships in either the economy or the 
polity (e.g. Buchanan 1990; Vanberg 2005). An example of the former is Friedrich von 
+D\HN¶V DWWHPSW WR EURDGHQ WKH FDWHJRU\ RI PDUNHW H[FKDQJH EH\RQG SXUH FRPPHUFLDO
transactions to include all horizontal social interactions ± a comprehensive field which Hayek 
describes as catallaxy (Hayek 1976). An example of the latter is Pierre %RXUGLHX¶VDFFRXQWRI
the state as not simply an instrumental apparatus for action in the public sphere but as a 
comprehensive field whose influence goes beyond purely political relations to encompass a 
wider range of social institutions and interactions (Bourdieu 2012). Either way, both positions 
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± by expanding the respective fields of economics and politics ± end up subsuming the social 
domain under either the logic of market exchange or the logic of formal decision-making in 
the circumscribed space of a polity identified with the modern nation state.  
 This paper shifts the emphasis to the concept of µDVVRFLDWLRQ¶, which we define as a set 
of relationships that have potential for both conflict and cooperation and that are not reducible 
to any of the above dualisms or to the binary logic that underpins them.6  
 Our view of association differs from (early) modern and contemporary accounts 
wedded to a dualistic approach. First, the Hobbesian heritage of inherently adversarial and 
lawless sociability in the µstate of nature¶ WKDWJLYHVULVHWRDµZDURIDOODJDLQVWDOO¶ZKLFKRQO\
the absolute power of the one over the many can regulate (Hobbes 1960, part I, chap. XVI, p. 
107 and part II, chap. XVII-XX, pp. 109-136). Second, the Rousseauian legacy of viewing 
humankind as born free but constrained by human association, and the Hegelian legacy of 
seeing civil society as a mere extension of the state (Rousseau 1997, Book I, 6, 4; Book I, 6, 
6-10; Book IV, 1, 1- 2, 5 and 7; Hegel 1991, II, 1, §§102-112, pp. 130-140, III, 2, §§180-256, 
pp. 220-274). Third, the Lockean and Smithian emphasis on commercial society as a set of 
contractually based interactions among private individuals where the particular self-interest of 
some is limited by the particular self-interest of others (Locke 1988, II, §6 and §135; Smith 
1978, pp. 335-40, 521-527). In different ways, all three theories subordinate association either 
to the will of the individual or to that of the collective, thereby ignoring the relational 
constraints and opportunities involved in social interdependence. 
 By contrast with the above approaches, we argue that association and the constitution 
of interests are plural and hybrid. This point of view distances itself from the contractualist 
tradition primarily because of a different approach to individuality and agency. The legal 
historian Paolo Grossi describes the contrast as one between ³the unitary subject of natural 
                                                        
6
 Our conception of association draws on the tradition stretching back to classical sources like Plato, Aristotle 
and Cicero that was developed by medieval, Renaissance and modern thinkers as diverse as Justus Lipsius, 
Ralph Cudworth, Giambattista Vico and Alexis de Tocqueville. However, in the present paper we do not explore 
the history of ideas that has shaped this account of association. 
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law, an a-historical and thus merely virtual subject, a model of human being, and nothing 
more´ and ³an intrinsically relational entity, fully embedded in a cultural, social and 
economic context, seen in conjunction with the other, the others, and connected to them by 
necessary and close-fitting bonds´ (Grossi, 2009, pp. 9-10). One possible objection to this 
view LV WKDW WKH LQWHUQDO VWUXFWXUH RI VRFLHW\ LV VR GLYHUVH DV WR SURGXFH µSDUDOOHO VRFLHWLHV¶
within a given territory and its people. Indeed, there has been much discussion about the 
growing plurality of late modern societies, including the pervasiveness of fundamental 
disagreements (political, economic, social and ethical) and the inability to resolve such 
disagreements rationally (e.g. Hirschman 1977; MacIntyre 1981). This has led contemporary 
thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls to argue that substantive values are 
incommensurable and that therefore it is only possible to agree on certain procedural 
mechanisms such as contractual arrangements backed by the rule of law (Berlin 1969; Rawls 
1971). Our conception of association seeks to overcome this opposition in the direction of a 
multi-layered social space in which there can be both disagreement on some substantive 
choices as well as agreement on others. In short, even an entrenched diversity of interests is 
not necessarily incompatible with a stable constitutional order provided that diversity allows 
for political economies arranged along a plurality of interdependent but self-governing 
spheres.7 
 The conception of constitution developed in this essay has implications for the theory 
of political economy itself. Building on Hicks, we move beyond his conception of political 
economy as a theory of the social product formation and distribution by emphasising the 
relative positions of individuals and groups and the ordering of economic functions that 
characterise any given society (Quesnay 1758; Romagnosi 1827 and 1835; Stein 1879). 
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 In his analysis of pre-modern constitutionalism Paolo Grossi has emphasized tKHUROHRI³SODVWLF OHJDO IRUPV 
that are inherently history-lDGHQ´, anG LQ ZKLFK ³law relates to the systemic and complex configuration of 
society and not to an encumbering political structure, RUWRDVWURQJSRZHUDSSDUDWXV´*URVVL49; see also 
Grossi 2007). This point raises the issue of the social embeddedness of the declarative speech acts in which 
normative legal statements are expressed (see Ruiter, 1993, 2001). 
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Classical political economy, both in its original formulations (Smith 1976 [1776]); Ricardo 
1951 [1817]) and in its modern appraisals and systematizations (Leontief 1991 [1928], 1941; 
Sraffa 1960; Quadrio Curzio 1967; Lowe 1976; Pasinetti 1977), provides a vantage point 
IURP ZKLFK WR DVVHVV WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI +LFNV¶V FRQFHSWLRQ IRU WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
arrangement of any given society. For classical political economy focuses on the formation 
and distribution of the social product through a system of interdependencies among 
productive sectors, while also presupposing a system of interdependencies between socio-
economic groups (such as workers, capitalists and rentiers). The former set of 
interdependencies highlights complementarities between productive sectors that may be at 
odds with the macroeconomic distribution of the social product among groups. That is 
because the relative shares of the social product accruing to certain groups may be inversely 
related to the shares of other groups, even if there may be a positive relation with the shares 
going to yet other groups (see, in particular, Quadrio Curzio 1990; Quadrio Curzio and 
Pellizzari 1999). 
 This perspective highlights the existence of distinct but interlocking conditions 
(respectively, in the technological and in the socio-institutional domains) that allow the 
formation of the social product DQG WKH SHUVLVWHQFH RI WKH HFRQRPLF V\VWHP¶V SURGXFWLYH
potential over time. In particular, the technological conditions ensuring the material viability 
of the productive system ought to be distinguished from the institutional conditions governing 
the distribution of the social product between groups. ,QGHHG WKH µHFRQRPLF IXQFWLRQV¶ RI
groups taking part in the distribution of the social product may or may not be compatible with 
given technological conditions for viability, and/or with macroeconomic conditions for the 
persistence of a given socio-economic structure. In the former case, the distribution of the 
social product may be such as to generate relative prices incompatible with the input 
requirements of each productive sector for commodities produced in other sectors of the 
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economy.8 In the latter case, the distribution of the social product may be associated with an 
accumulation process making the persistence of certain social classes dynamically unfeasible 
in the long run (Baranzini 1991; Baranzini and Scazzieri 1997). 
 Our focus on relational structures of interests and on systemic functions binds together 
µSROLWLFDO HFRQRP\¶ with µFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶. 7KH µSROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ RI FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶ ZH DUH 
outlining is a structured space of social relationships wherein human action is motivated by 
multiple objectives that can give rise to both conflict and cooperation between individuals 
and/or groups, and in which different configurations of interests may or may not be 
compatible with the systemic requirements of economic organisation. Sections 2 and 3 
develop this conception of constitution by focusing on the configuration of interests and their 
mapping according to different constitutional arrangements. 
 
2. Constitution and the structure of interests: pathways to political economy 
Within the domain of political economy, constitution is the sphere of admissible but partially 
realised connections between individuals and/or groups. Different constitutional 
arrangements allow for diverse ways of defining and defending the interests of individuals 
and groups. A heuristic of interests, which are shaped within a given social domain, is 
therefore a key conceptual building block for developing the political economy of 
constitution. The aim of this section is to provide a set of analytical tools for this type of 
heuristic. 
 
2.1 The constitutionalist vs. the contractualist tradition 
The above argument suggests a fundamental difference between constitution and contract. 
The former can be construed as a system of admissible actions reflecting societal interests, 
                                                        
8
 $FDVHLQSRLQWLVWKDWRIWKH5XVVLDQµVFLVVRUFULVLV¶RIWKHPLG-1920s, which may be seen as resulting from the 
failure of relative prices of agricultural versus industrial products to meet the material viability conditions 
associated with technology in use (see Seton, 1992, 2000). 
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dispositions and beliefs (constitution µin the material sense¶) that may or may not be 
associated with a corresponding system of formal norms and procedures (constitution µin the 
formal sense¶). The latter can be defined as a legal commitment generated by deliberation and 
choice. Constitutional settlements may sometimes result from confrontation and deliberation 
that involve interested parties, therefore resembling contracts, while contracts may sometimes 
lead to the introduction of charters in the public sphere, therefore resembling constitutions. 
However, from the point of view of institutional dynamics, constitutions are not contracts. 
They could be described as arrangements emerging from within a structured social space and 
expressing the patterns of connectivity existing within that space (see McIlwain 1939; 
Matteucci 1976, 1993; Hicks 1981; Sen 2008; Pabst 2014 for a criticism of the subordination 
of constitution to contract). The concept of congruence is fundamental from a constitutional 
point of view. It expresses SDWWHUQVRIµPXWXDOILWWLQJ¶EHWZHHQWKHFRQVWLWXHQWHOHPHQWVRIany 
given social system that define the conditions for cooperation and/or conflict within and 
across social groups (see also Polanyi, 2001). These patterns are not captured by 
contractualist theories insofar as tKHODWWHUHPSKDVLVHWKHµFRYHQDQWRIUHDVRQ¶/HYLDV
the foundation for agreement or disagreement within the economic and political fields. The 
contractualist approach ends up neglecting pre-existing social bonds. By contrast, the 
constitutional approach draws attention to the multiplicity of bonds that enhance the overall 
potential for cooperation and/or conflict within any given society.9 
 This notion of µcongruence¶ underscores the multi-layered, and often hierarchical, 
configuration of interests in µKLJKO\ VWUDWLILHG VRFLDO V\VWHPV¶ +RGJVRQ 2009). Any given 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DUUDQJHPHQW SURYLGHV D µFLUFXPVFULSWLRQ¶ RI LQWHUHVWV DQG WKHLU RUGHULQJ
according to certain priorities. Identifying which interests are relevant and which ones are not 
is a core function of constitution in relation to political economy. In other words, describing 
the relative positions and overlaps between interests is central to conceptualising political 
                                                        
9
 The implications of the distinction for constitutional dynamics are discussed in Runst and Wagner, 2011. 
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economy and evaluating which patterns of conflict and/or cooperation it may give rise to. 
WLWKRXWVXFKDµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLGHQWLW\¶LWZRXOGEHDUELWUDU\WRSRVLWPXWXDOO\ILWWLQJLQWHUHVWV 
and to determine feasible policy options. 
 2XU FRQFHSWLRQ RI SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ KLJKOLJKWV WKH UHODWLRQDO QDWXUH RI µLQWHUHVW¶ LQ
two ways. First, the interests of individuals and groups are expressed in view of their relative 
position vis-à-vis the interests of other individuals and groups. Second, individual and group 
interests are embedded within a set of relationships that are irreducible to purely contractual 
arrangements because the relative initial positions are not a matter of choice. Indeed, the very 
etymology of the term µinterest¶ (inter-esseVXJJHVWVWKHLQKHUHQWµLQ-EHWZHHQQHVV¶RIVRFLDO
actors (Ornaghi 1990). This conception relDWHV µLQWHUHVW¶ WR WKH UHFLSURFDO FRQVWUDLQWV DQG
opportunities that characterise the membership of any given individual or group in a specific 
social sphere. The constitution of any given political economy is therefore inherently 
associated with the relatively persistent configuration of multi-layered and partially 
overlapping interests compatible with the existing social structure (see also Pagano, 2011). 
 Our account of constitution presupposes a multiplicity of partially overlapping 
connections at different levels. This is to say that constitution allows individuals and/or 
groups to relate to other individuals and/or groups at a certain level while relating yet other 
individuals and/or groups at another level. Here the proximity model of civil society provides 
a relevant interpretive framework insofar as in this model ³individuals or groups derive their 
identity from a variety of attributes´ such that ³some of those attributes are central in a given 
relational domain but secondary in another domain´ (Pabst and Scazzieri 2012: 345). In a 
social domain whose structuring follows the above pattern, sociability is linked to multiple 
forms of connectivity in two different ways. First, the distance between individuals or groups 
is characterised by a significant variety across society (individuals and groups may be distant 
from each other to a greater or lesser degree within the same constitutional structure). Second, 
the notion of distance is itself relative to the nature of interdependence in question, which may 
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impinge on profession, location or cultural affinity (any two individuals or groups may be 
close or distant depending on the dimension of distance under consideration).10 This notion of 
proximity shifts the emphasis away from a single set of standards towards a multi-
dimensional, inclusive space of dispositions and connections. An important feature of the 
structure described above is that social congruence may be achieved through ³WKHH[LVWHQFHRI
a congruence class including all subjects sharing a common attribute (which can be primary to 
certain subjects and secondary to others, or even secondary to all)´3DEVWDQG6FD]]LHUL
VHHDOVR6FD]]LHUL7KLVVWUXFWXUHRIFRQQHFWLRQV³DOORZVVHOHFWLYHFORVXUHRIORFDO
domains but is open to congruence across those domains´ 3DEVW DQG 6FD]]LHUL  345; 
added emphasis). 
 
2.2 Social cleavages and cooperation thresholds 
An important question arising in this framework is whether the existence of multiple and 
partially overlapping spheres of interest is a hindrance or a help towards social congruence. 
Connected with this is the question of whether plural interests are conducive to cooperation or 
conflict. Clearly, there can be a potentially constructive role of non-coinciding spheres of 
interest in society. The fact that individual or group A may be opposed to individual or group 
B on issue x, but also closely allied to group B on issue y, may provide an important condition 
for congruence in a fragmented, heterogeneous social domain (see, for instance, Rae and 
Taylor 1970; Mutz 2002 and 2006). This point of view has been applied, for instance, by the 
political scientist Arend Lijphart in his analysis of the reasons for congruence in Dutch 
society (Lijphart 1975 and 1977). Some of the founding fathers of the American Republic 
argued in the same direction (Hamilton et al. 2003). On the other hand, fragmentation of 
interests may also lead to the opposite outcome. Cleavages, even if not coinciding, may still 
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 This metric of social distance presupposes a multi-dimensional approach to the identity of individuals and 
groups. (See Gardenfors, 2000; Warglien and Gardenfors, 2013 for the analysis of the cognitive foundations of 
this metric.)  
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make congruence more difficult. This can happen when the social domain is so completely 
fractured that spheres of shared interest become very hard, if not altogether impossible, to 
detect. Recent theoretical and empirical work on failed states calls attention to this dark side 
of social differentiation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005 and 2012). 
 If the latter situation arises, group A may be separated from individual or group B on 
issue x, and yet potentially allied to B on issue y. In addition, it may be that individual or 
group B is separated from group C on issue w and yet allied to individual or group D on issue 
z. Here the plurality of issues may or may not help social congruence. For each individual or 
group, awareness that issues x, y, w and z may provide room for cooperation or conflict within 
the social space is not necessarily a condition favouring cooperative solutions. In this 
complex and highly fragmented social space, fear of being sidelined may prevail over the 
disposition to look for cooperative solutions. In other words, there may be conditions in 
which multiple cleavages, even if not fully overlapping, make congruence more difficult to 
achieve. Formally, let, i = 1, 2 « k denote the number of issues on which individuals or 
groups may clash over, or cooperate with, each other. It is reasonable to assume that different 
individuals or groups will weigh in different ways their gains or losses for the different issues 
at stake. For example, certain issues may take lexicographic precedence over other issues for 
certain individuals or groups and not for others. Let fj(P) be the preference ranking over social 
outcomes for individual or group j (j = «Q) and let fj(P) be a linear convex combination of 
the different partial objectives that individual or group j may be assumed to have on the 
different relevant issues: fj(P) = Ȝ1fi(P) + Ȝ2f2(P) «+Ȝkfk(P), with Ȝk =  1.11 We may 
conjecture that potential compromise prevails over potential conflict if the two following 
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 We owe to the economist and probability theorist Bruno de Finetti (1975) the view that human practical goals 
can generally be construed as the outcome of a weighing procedure starting from the recognition of the variety of 
objectives that any individual or social group is likely tRSXUVXH,QGH)LQHWWL¶VZRUGVWKLVHQWDLOVDYRLGLQJ³WR
immediately fix a global preference relation, that is, a function f(P) directly including in a final synthesis all 
FRPSRQHQWVRI MXGJHPHQW´ E\ FRQVLGHULQJ LQVWHDG ³GLIIHUHQW FRPSRQHQWVRU IHDWXUHV of judgement, or partial 
objectives. Formally, this means to introduce, firstly, different functions f1(P), f2(P), ..., fn(P), and only 
subsequently [...] to derive the final function f(P), which would obviously be an increasing function of all the 
fh(P)´ (de Finetti 1975: 645). 
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conditions hold: (a) the number of divisive issues i is less or equal to İ; (b) for each individual 
or group j, the distance between the maximum weight Ȝj max and the minimum weight Ȝj min 
is greater than ı. This conjecture suggests that compromise is likely to prevail over open 
conflict when the number of divisive issues is not too great and provided individuals or 
groups weigh social outcomes in a sufficiently differentiated way across possible social 
situations. The two conditions taken together denote what we may call the coordination 
threshold for the polity under consideration.12  
 The above configuration of interests suggests possible ways in which plurality may be 
compatible with social congruence. The political economy of constitution is essential in 
making visible the reasons for membership in any given body politic and in highlighting the 
way in which partial conflicts may be compatible with overall congruence. A properly 
configured constitutional heuristics highlights the conditions for identifying a realistic 
cooperation threshold. In particular, any given constitution presupposes a mapping from the 
full set of relevant interests in the social domain to the subset of those interests that are 
directly relevant to social congruence.13 
 The constitutional mapping of interests emphasises µFLUFXPVFULSWLRQ¶DVDFULWLFDOstep 
in identifying conditions for social congruence (Scazzieri 2006). This means that congruence 
is seldom achieved in a uniform way across the different spheres of the social domain. Rather, 
overall congruence often results from the existence of partial, although not mutually 
exclusive, patterns of congruence in a variety of different social spheres. A mapping of 
interests through constitutional settlement highlights certain possibilities of social congruence 
                                                        
12
 The coordination threshold characterizes any given social situation, which may be described as ³the precise 
specification of the alternatives that are available to the individuals [or groups]´ (Greenberg, 1990, p. 2). A focus 
on social situations ³specifies the opportunities that are available to coalitions, but does not require that an 
explicit and rigid "process" be given concerning the exact way in which coalitions can form´ (Greenberg, 1990, 
p. 5). 
13
 7KHFRQFHSWRI µV\VWHPLF LQWHUHVW¶within a complex web of political-economic interdependencies describes 
the condition making partial conflicts compatible with overall social congruence (Cardinale 2015: 202). 
Constitutional heuristic provides analytical tools for the identification of systemic interest and of the way it may 
be embedded in the institutional framework of any given political-economic system. 
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in lieu of others.14 In particular considering two groups with seemingly incompatible interests, 
circumscription may be conducive to social congruence in one of two ways. First, 
circumscription allows shifting from a lower-order conflictual representation of the social 
domain to a higher-order representation of the same domain in which commonalities rather 
than conflicts of interest are in view. Second (and conversely), circumscription may also 
enable two groups to identify lower-order patterns of congruence in spite of higher-order 
conflicts that may be variously related to ideological commitments or sectional interests. 
 It is worth noting that the mapping of interests through constitutional settlements 
requires a close look at the specific interests of individuals and groups, but does not 
presuppose congruence devices based on interpersonal standpoints of the µimpartial spectator¶ 
type (Smith, 1976 [1759], Darwall, 2006, Sen, 2010). In other words, there is no attempt at 
redefining interests so as to make them compatible with systemic congruence, but there is 
open acknowledgement that interests may indeed be sharply different within any given social 
sphere. However, it is also acknowledged that stakeholders may have conflicting interests in 
some spheres and coinciding interests in other spheres. A constitutional settlement in the 
material sense takes stock of this differentiated plurality of interests across social spheres and 
makes differences compatible with systemic congruence (see above). 
 
2.3 Circumscription of interests by constitution or by contract 
µCircumscription by contractual arrangement¶ and µcircumscription by constitutional 
settlement¶ point to the possibility of two radically different routes to social congruence. The 
former is conducive to adjustment of conflicts of interests by contract: recognition of 
differences may be a condition for a partial reconfiguration of interests so as to make 
differences compatible with congruence (the Rawlsian µveil of ignorance¶ argument being a 
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 This feature introduces one important difference with respect to the types of social congruence that may be 
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special case of this situation [Rawls, 1971]). On the other hand, the latter also presupposes 
differences, but does not presume that differences can either ultimately be assumed away or 
thought to be absolute. In this case, a differentiated and multi-layered configuration of 
interests persists after the constitutional settlement and is indeed a necessary condition for its 
survival.15 
 However, interests are not simply given but they also derive from specific 
representations of the relative position of any group within the social domain. Such 
representations presuppose vantage points that give structure to individual and collective 
perceptions and provide guidance for social action. In other words, particular interests can 
only be defined and acted upon in relation to a distinct set of weights (values). 
 IGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI YDOXHV DV µVSHFLILFDWRUV¶ RI LQWHUHVW is a critical device in order to 
identify practicable ways in which consider and implement constitutional settlements. The 
process of circumscribing different interests requires the consideration of values because 
values (as weights) are a way of attaching priority to certain interests over others.  
 At this juncture the issue of conflicting or even incommensurable values arises. Here 
one can maintain that plurality of values is analogous to plurality of interests. It is true that 
there are rival, incompatible, and even incommensurable values (Berlin 1969; Sen 2010). 
However, this plurality of values does not necessarily imply that individuals and/or groups in 
any given society may not also have shared interests and goals. Bearing in mind that values 
are multi-layered and that they can be distinguished in terms of first-, second- and further-
order values, the circumscription may take place through an interplay of interest specification 
and the ordering of values vis-à-vis each other.  
 A case in point would be if circumscription from a lower- to a higher-order 
constellation of interests would end up in a conflict between seemingly incommensurable 
objectives, which may in turn be solved by identifying an appropriate system of weights 
                                                        
15
 Our focus on material constitutional settlement suggests conditions for the endurance of formal constitutions 
that go beyond the voting rules of self-stable constitutions as discussed in Barbera and Jackson 2004. 
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across different objectives (such as the relative balance between freedom and equality).16 
Similarly, the circumscription from a higher- to a lower-order constellation of interests may 
help to solve seemingly foundational value conflicts by discovering shared objectives that had 
hitherto been ignored or neglected (for example by moving from high-level political 
allegiance to a regard for fundamental conditions of human survival). 
 This argument has far-reaching implications for the political economy of constitution. 
Constitutional arrangements, and the institutional set-up which they shape, are not reducible 
either to a fixed set of values or to formal, procedural mechanisms. Rather, constitutions 
reflect and, at the same time, structure the pre-existing social ties that characterise societies. 
Circumscription of interests is key to identifying relative positions and functions of different 
groups within any given social sphere, which concerns both the reality and the representation 
of interests and the weights attached to them. Since constitutions relate to both interests and 
weights, constitutional settlements exceed the domain of legal-juridical norms and encompass 
the µPDWHULDO¶ FRQILJXration of weighted interests in the social domain. This has significant 
consequences for the analysis of markets and states. In particular, markets should weights 
buyers and sellers differently in different trades, thus reflecting the distribution of market 
influence within and across trades, and states should be seen as encompassing a multiplicity 
of micro-domains with their distinct functions and roles as well as specific policy objectives.  
(See, in this connection, McCormick¶VFRQFHSWRIµ6HNWRUDOVWDDW¶, McCormick, 2007a, and b). 
The central purpose of constitution is therefore to uphold this plurality of domains and to 
ensure conditions for social congruence within and across those domains. 
 
3. The constitution of economic policy 
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 In terms of the formal argument above, seemingly incommensurable objectives may be compatible with social 
congruence provided different groups associate different weights to those objectives. For example, a 
constitutional compromise is possible between two groups associated with significantly different levels of per 
capita income provided the worse off group attaches more importance to freedom than the better off group.  
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The argument of the two previous sections of this paper has important implications for the 
identification of the appropriate contexts of economic policy decisions. In fact, the two ideas 
RIµVRFLHW\¶DVDPXOWL-OD\HUHGFRQILJXUDWLRQRI LQWHUHVWVDQGRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶DVDPDSSLQJ
from this configuration of interests to a core set of interests compatible with systemic 
congruence, suggests that the framing of economic policy should be seen neither as a simple 
exercise in majority rule, nor as the top-down implementation of directives from some central 
authority. Rather, any working constitutional settlement should be viewed as a device 
µfiltering¶ the configuration of interests in society and making visible the systemic interests of 
that particular society. 
 From this point of view, there is a close connection between policy-making and 
constitutional arrangements. Insofar as policies cannot simply be matters of contingent 
decision-making, they presume a framing exercise that is itself grounded in the constitutional 
mapping of interests as defined above. This perspective suggests that any given constitutional 
mapping of interests is also an instrument for identifying problem spaces in which policy 
issues may be addressed in ways that are compatible with the existing conditions for social 
congruence. In particular, different policy domains could presuppose different spheres of 
interest and be conducive to different conditions for congruence. 
 Constitutional settlements presuppose a de facto fragmentation of the policy space, so 
that no effective assessment of policy measures is conceivable independently of the specific 
circumscription of interests characterizing the political economy in view. Any political 
HFRQRP\HQWDLOVDVSHFLILFVHWRIDGPLVVLEOHSROLFLHVZKLFKPD\LQWXUQEHµGHFRPSRVHG¶LQ
terms of a hierarchy of policy principles (which over time may be subject to change). This 
means that the effectiveness of any given policy tool cannot be properly assessed unless the 
assessment exceeds the issue of instrumental value (an end that justifies the means) and 
encompasses questions about the desirability of alternative policy tools. In practice, this 
involves assigning a given admissible value, or threshold, to a certain set of policy variables 
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(such as the µDFFHSWDEOH¶level of unemployment, or the macroeconomic rate of inflation) and 
then following a maximizing or satisficing procedure to determine the values of other policy 
instruments (see Tinbergen VHHDOVR0DU]HWWL'DOO¶$VWH Brandolini 2011: 318-20). This 
procedure highlights the sequential character of policy decision-making and the need to weigh 
the consistency of its different steps with the existing circumscription of interests in the 
political economy under consideration.  
 To frame policy discussion in these terms entails moving beyond the micro-macro 
dichotomy and to assess policy options in terms of complex constellations of socio-economic 
interests they are likely to affect. The implications of this type of constitutional heuristic are 
far-reaching. For example, the political economy of the Eurozone is likely to appear in a 
different light if attention is focussed on the sectoral, national, or European level, seeing as 
conflicts and overlaps of interests are likely to be different at different levels of aggregation 
(Cardinale, Coffman, and Scazzieri 2017). Similarly, the same stakeholders may assess 
differently the same trade policy options, such as degrees of free trade versus degrees of 
protection, depending on which political-economic units they belong, say a continental 
economic area or a small trading country (Reinert and Røge, 2013). 
 To identify the appropriate unit of analysis may be the most critical step in assessing 
the feasibility of policy options, since constellations of interests supporting that option may 
exist at certain levels of aggregation but not at others. This may be achieved by dividing the 
overall policy domain into a multiplicity of sub-domains and by focussing on the sub-domain 
in which the supporting constellation of interests is most clearly in view.17 An effective 
constitution should be able to express the multi-layered configuration of interests in society 
by mapping plural interests into different core sets compatible first with local and ultimately 
with overall social congruence (Cardinale and Coffman 2014). What we have in mind is a 
representation of different interests in such a way that they can come together for certain 
                                                        
17 This multi-OD\HUHGVWUXFWXULQJRILQWHUHVWVPD\DOVREHDUHVSRQVHWR2OVRQ¶VIUee rider problem (Olson, 1971). 
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shared solutions by properly identifying the areas of compromise and the level at which 
compromise can be attained ± even when overall agreement is impossible. 
 This framework does not rule out disagreement, divergence or even a clash of rival 
interests. But divisive conflict should not be the default position upon which to base the 
framing of economic policy (see also Testa, Hibbing and Ritchie 2014). The political 
economy of µmaterial constitution¶ seeks to provide a heuristic for recognition of multiple and 
partially overlapping spheres of interest in society. It is in fact the existence of partial overlaps 
between spheres of interest that provides room for accommodation both directly within 
spheres where conflict seems prima facie dominant and indirectly by suggesting devices for 
accommodation through spheres of interest seemingly distant from the original ones. These 
overlaps intimate connections in the social domain and are much more likely to be found if 
sociability itself is seen as built upon a multiplicity of partially overlapping connections 
between individuals or social groups (Pabst and Scazzieri 2012). This argument suggests 
moving beyond the consideration of one-off contractual arrangements and allowing 
transactions to take place repeatedly and as part of a larger web of social connections.18 
 The dichotomy between consensus and conflict is not just a matter of individual policy 
choices but goes back to the fundamental structure of constitutional arrangements. From our 
political economy perspective, what is at stake is the plurality of economic interests, the 
conditions for their effective representation, and the actual participation of key stakeholders in 
both deliberation and decision-making. In this connection, it is customary to distinguish 
between majoritarian and consociational models of constitution (Lijphart 1977 and 2012). 
Even though these two models deal differently with actual conflict, both nevertheless tend to 
assume that the underlying interests are rival and that any solution would be of the zero-sum 
game type (which involves at least temporary winners and losers). By contrast, the 
constitutional heuristic outlined in this paper emphasises constitutional congruence as explicit 
                                                        
18
 Here our argument builds on the notion of relational contract theory (McNeil 2003) and cognate concepts that 
emphasise the underlying sociability that is more primary than short-term interests. 
  
20 
recognition of differentiated but partially overlapping interests and an acknowledgement that 
effective policy-making requires the involvement of relevant stakeholders across different 
levels of the policy domain. 
 To sum up: effective policy-making presupposes consistency with D µPDWHULDO¶ 
constitutional settlement that reflects a balance of sectoral and geographic interests. It also 
presupposes a highly differentiated participation in deliberative and decision-making 
processes depending on the interests involved across different policy domains. This condition 
is necessary to allow the building of multiple coalitions of interests on separate policy issues, 
thus privileging multi-dimensional congruence over one-dimensional conflict or consensus at 
the different levels of aggregation of the policy domain.19 Neither exclusively top-down, 
unitary structures nor purely bottom-up fragmented arrangements are adequate to this task. 
Our argument points to the central relevance RIDµPL[HGFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶ZLWKSOXral sources of 
sovereignty translating into hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions and multi-level 
governance. Such a mixed constitution would reflect the multi-layered nature of interests in 




This paper has outlined a conceptual framework for the analysis of µmaterial¶ constitutions as 
the fundamental organisation of political economies. It has explored the view that the 
economic constitution of any given society takes shape at a level of connectivity at which 
multiple interests may coexist, clash and/or coalesce within the same social sphere. 
Constitutional settlements can be seen as the relatively persistent arrangement of 
differentiated interests vis-à-vis each other in a given society. The political economy of 
constitutions highlights the context-dependence of constitutional settlements and points to the 
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congruence between those settlements and the historical conditions under which they were 
attained.  
 By the same means, the political economy of constitution, without being intrinsically 
normative, provides a benchmark that allows assessment of any given constitutional 
settlement relative to its own formative period and fundamental architecture. A given 
constitution may express a past constellation of interests that is still dominant in the present, 
or it may reflect a system of weights between social interests that has become obsolete under 
present conditions. The political economy of constitution may be conceived as a heuristic to 
detect the configuration of interests inherent to any given constitutional settlement and to 
assess its continuing or declining relevance as the economic-political system evolves through 
time. 
 Our argument emphasises the constitutive congruence of the social domain with the 
political and economic spheres and is thus different from the idea of the contractualist 
covenant in terms of formal rights and duties. The social domain denotes those sets of 
relationships that underpin the ordering of functions and relative positions within any given 
society. These functions and positions are thus more primary than both rights and contracts on 
the one hand, and of formal positions of authority on the other hand. 
 Our analysis rests upon thHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHµFRYHQDQWRIUHDVRQ¶/HYL
that underlies the contractualist paradigm and WKH µFRYHQDQW RI SUDFWLFH¶ WKDW XQGHUSLQV WKH
constitutionalist paradigm. The latter broadens the domain of political economy beyond the 
allocation of given resources between competing individuals or groups and extends it to the 
organisation of interdependencies between WKRVH LQGLYLGXDOV RU JURXSV ,Q OLQH ZLWK +LFNV¶
YLHZ RI µSOXWRORJ\¶ DV WKH VWXG\ RI WKH VRFLHWDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ RI WKH IXQFWLRQV E\ PHDQs of 
which the production and distribution of resources take place, we highlighted the organisation 
of interests in society, the mapping of these interests into constitutional settlements, and the 
economic-political nature of any such arrangement. We also stress the implications of 
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constitutional settlements for economic policy-making. Constitutions, as defined in our 
analysis, circumscribe the relevant spheres of interest and their interdependence under given 
historical conditions. In this way, they are central in circumscribing the domains for policy 
making and in determining the conditions under which policy decisions can be effective. 
 In conclusion, this paper has focused upon constitutional heuristic as a means to 
identify the ways in which existing constellations of interest are circumscribed and mapped 
into a specific constitutional settlement. Constitutional heuristic calls attention to the manifold 
overlap of interests in society and highlights the role of weights in making different objectives 
mutually compatible within the same social sphere, or within distinct but mutually connected 
spheres. This approach has significant implications for the definition of policy domains and 
the identification of conditions for successful policy making. In particular, our conception of 
constitutional heuristic calls attention to substantive arrangements between stakeholders, and 
correspondingly emphasizes the existence of substantive policy domains in which decisions 
match the existing structure of weights. In particular, such a constitutional heuristic discloses 
the feasibility of substantive arrangements between individuals or groups, and 
correspondingly emphasises the existence of policy domains in which decisions congruent 
with the existing constitutional mapping can be taken and implemented. 
 The political economy of µmaterial¶ constitution grounds the configuration of 
economic-political conditions in the structured connectivity of society. Such a political 
economy highlights the prerequisites for the viability of normative arrangements in any given 
context and the specificity of the policy options that are feasible in some contexts and not 
feasible in others. 
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